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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Ronald Favini appeals from the district court's Sentencing Disposition and Notice
of Right to Appeal.

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Favini asserted that the district court

violated his Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination when the district
court used information from a competency evaluation, conducted pursuant to Idaho
Code § 18-211 (hereinafter, 18-211 evaluation), against him during his jurisdictional
review hearing, requiring his sentence to be vacated and a new review hearing ordered
Alternatively, Mr. Favini asserted that his ultimately-imposed unified sentence of fifty
years, with five years fixed, stemming from a jury finding him guilty of aggravated
battery and the district court finding him to be a persistent violator, was excessive in
light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case.
In response, the State has asserted that Mr. Favini failed to demonstrate
fundamental error in the court's use of his 18-211 evaluation against him, and further
failed to demonstrate that his sentence was excessive. (See generally, Respondent's
Brief.) This Reply Brief is necessary to address certain factual assertions and legal
conclusions made by the State in its Respondent's Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Favini's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in detail in this Reply Brief,
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Favini's Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination when it improperly used information obtained for purposes of
determining Mr. Favini's competency, during the jurisdictional review hearing?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in
light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Violated Mr. Favini's Fifth Amendment Privilege Against SelfIncrimination When It Improperly Used Information Obtained For Purposes Of
Determining Mr. Favini's Competency, During The Jurisdictional Review Hearing

A.

Introduction
Mr. Favini asserts that the district court improperly considered the conclusions

contained within his 18-211 evaluation, which were based in part on statements that he
made during the 18-211 evaluation, as an aggravating circumstance when determining
Mr. Favini's sentence during the jurisdictional review hearing. Although the district court
did not mention the 18-211 evaluation when it originally imposed sentence (Tr., p.286,
L.1 - p.308, L.13), and further gave no indication that it was going to use the 18-211
evaluation in aggravation until after the court announced that it would relinquish
jurisdiction (Tr. Supp., p.15, L.2 - p.18, L.24), and, thus, trial counsel had no indication
that an objection was needed, Mr. Favini nevertheless asserted in his Appellant's Brief,
that his claim was reviewable for fundamental error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-8.)
In response, the State asserts that Mr. Favini failed to show a constitutional
violation arguing that the district court could consider the contents of the 18-211
evaluation because trial counsel asked for a different mental health evaluation, pursuant
to I.C. § 19-2524. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-6.) Next, the State asserts that because
Mr. Favini requested both an 18-211 evaluation and a mental health evaluation, his
failure to object may have been a tactical decision. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) Finally,
the State asserts that "[b]ecause the court ultimately concluded that Favini's criminal
behavior did not stem from mental illness, there is no basis in the record to believe that
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his sentence would have been different if the competency evaluation had not been
considered by the court." (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) For the reasons demonstrated
below, the State's arguments are without merit.

B.

The Use Of Mr. Favini's 18-211 Evaluation Against Him At Sentencing Violated
His Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination
Whenever statements made in an Idaho Code § 18-211 competency evaluation

are used against the defendant, a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to be free from
compelled self-incrimination is implicated. Mitchell v. United States, 562 U.S. 314, 32527 (1999); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 56364 (2006); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 871-72 (1989).

However, statements

made in such an evaluation can be lawfully used in three situations: 1) where a
defendant consents to the use of those statements, i.e., the defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waives his Fifth Amendment privilege in those statements;
2) where the statements are used to impeach the defendant; and, 3) where the
statements are used as rebuttal evidence. See Estelle, supra; Buchanan v. Kentucky,
483 U.S. 402 (1987); see also I.C. § 18-215. None of these exceptions apply in this
case.
The State relies upon the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion in State v. Jockumson,
148 Idaho 817 (Ct. App. 2010), which in turn cites to Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S.
402 (1987), for the proposition that there was no constitutional violation. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.4-6.)

The State reasons that because defense counsel requested that a

mental health evaluation be performed pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2524, there could
be no Constitutional violation. Id. The State's argument is in error.
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Neither Buchanan nor Jockumson stand for the proposition asserted by the
State.

The mere act of counsel requesting that a mental health evaluation of the

defendant be conducted, does not act as a waiver of the defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege in a competency evaluation.

C.f State v Hanson, 152 Idaho 314 (2012)

(holding that a defendant may waive privilege and submit to a psychological
examination without waiving privilege with respect to participating in a Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI); see also, Estelle supra; Buchanan supra;
Jockumson supra. In the present case, Mr. Favini never waived his Fifth Amendment
rights in his 18-211 evaluation and the State did not offer the 18-211 evaluation as
either impeachment or rebuttal evidence. (Tr. p.293, L.3 - p.295, L.24; Tr. Supp., p.10,
L.23-p.13, L.1) In fact, the State did not rely upon the 18-211 evaluation at all. Id. It
was not until after the district court announced that it was relinquishing jurisdiction that
the court mentioned the contents of the 18-211 evaluation. (Tr. Supp., p.15, L.2 - p.18,
L.24.) The State's argument that the use of the 18-211 evaluation did not implicate
Mr. Favini's Fifth Amendment right because he also agreed to participate in a 19-2524
mental health evaluation is without merit.

C.

The Error Plainly Exists As There Is Nothing To Support The Conclusion That
The Failure To Object To The Use Of The 18-211 Evaluation Was Strategic
The State's second argument is essentially a restatement of its first argument.

The State argues,
Rather than merely showing no need for additional evidence on whether
the lack of objection to consideration of the competency evaluation was
the result of tactical choice, the record shows that the defense wanted
information about Favini's mental health to be considered at sentencing.
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(Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The State reasons that because Mr. Favini requested both
an 18-211 evaluation, and a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, "the
lack of an objection to consideration of the competency evaluation may have been
tactical." (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The State's argument is without merit
First, the district court never indicated that it was going to make the 18-211
evaluation a part of the PSI and defense counsel never asked the court to do so. At the
beginning of the sentencing hearing, the court asked Mr. Favini if he had read the
18-211 evaluation, and then gave Mr. Favini more time to review the document.
(Tr. p.286, L.2 - p.287, L.2.)

The court never indicated that the 18-211 evaluation

would be considered for anything other than to determine Mr. Favini's competency to
proceed; therefore, there was nothing for Mr. Favini's counsel to object to during the
sentencing hearing. Id. Likewise, as noted above, the district court gave no indication
that it was considering the contents of the 18-211 evaluation in aggravation until after it
had pronounced its decision to relinquish jurisdiction.
L.24.)

(Tr. Supp., p.15, L.2 - p.18,

Again, there was nothing for defense counsel to objection to.

The failure to

object where there was no indication that an objection was necessary, could hardly be
considered "sandbagging." See generally, State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
Additionally, assuming that defense counsel should be able to rely upon the fact
that the district court is aware of the requirements of the laws that it is applying, the very
nature of an 18-211 evaluation eliminates the necessity for an objection to the court's
use of that evaluation against the defendant. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-215,
A statement made by a person subjected to psychiatric or psychological
examination or treatment pursuant to sections 18-211, 18-212 or 19-2522,
Idaho Code, for the purposes of such examination or treatment shall not
be admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding against him on
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any issue other than the defendant's ability to assist counsel at trial
or to form any specific intent which is an element of the crime
charged, except that such statements of a defendant to a psychiatrist or
psychologist as are relevant for impeachment purposes may be received
subject to the usual rules of evidence governing matters of impeachment.
I.C. § 18-215 (emphasis added).

In order to find that Mr. Favini's counsel's failure to

object was a strategic decision, this Court must assume that Mr. Favini's counsel knew
that the district court would not apply the clear mandate of I.C. § 18-215 not to consider
statements made during the 18-211 evaluation proceedings for unlawful purposes.
There is simply nothing in this case to suggest that defense counsel should have been
aware that the district court would violate the clear tenets of I.C. § 18-215 and
strategically chose not to object, especially considering the fact that the district court did
not indicate that it would violate I.C. § 18-215 until after it had already made its
relinquishment decision. The State's argument is without merit.

D.

Mr. Favini Has Demonstrated Prejudice As The District Court Used Information In
The 18-211 Evaluation In Aggravation
As noted in the Appellant's Brief (pp.7-8), after pronouncing its sentence, the

district court stated, "I'm not seeing anything now that would indicate that your mental
concerns are anything - any more legitimate than the concerns that you and your
attorney argued at the time of sentencing, and I'll talk more about that here in a minute."
(Tr. Supp., p.15, L.2 - p.16, L.2.)

The district court went on to discuss its view of

Mr. Favini's mental health condition and the court's own feeling that it does not
contribute to Mr. Favini's "antisocial behavior," and further stated the following:
You have been given several mental health evaluations, and none
of them show any mental illness that would explain your conduct. We
have a report from Amanda Wilson, a mental health screening evaluation,
the diagnosis of malingering and an antisocial personality disorder, in
addition to your alcohol dependence and your cocaine dependence and
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your amphetamine dependence, and that was regarding her evaluation of
you April 26, 2011. A couple of months later, June 13th , 2011,
Dr. Parkman, a psychologist, diagnosed you essentially similarly
with personality disorder, not otherwise specified, with marked
borderline, schizotypal and antisocial features in addition to your
poly-substance dependence, generalized anxiety disorder, mood
disorder, and then - I think that was the extent of the mental health
evaluations.
(Tr. Supp., p.18, Ls.1-15 (emphasis added).)

In spite of this, the State asserts that,

"[b]ecause the court ultimately concluded that Favini's criminal behavior did not stem
from mental illness, there is no basis in the record to believe that his sentence would
have been different if the competency evaluation had not been considered by the court."
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) This Court, however, should consider the actual impact of
the 18-211 evaluation on the district court's decision, rather than try to imagine what the
district court would have done had it not considered the 18-211 evaluation.
The district court actually relied upon the 18-211 evaluation to justify its
sentence. The court specifically cited to Dr. Parkman's conclusions as failing to explain
Mr. Favini's criminal behavior, apparently not recognizing that an 18-211 evaluation is
not intended to explain a defendant's criminal behavior. (Tr. Supp., p.18, Ls.1-15.) The
district court used the conclusions reached by Dr. Parkman in the 18-211 evaluation
against Mr. Favini during the jurisdictional review hearing, and Dr. Parkman's
conclusions were derived, at least in part, from statements that Mr. Favini made to
Dr. Parkman. Id.

Mr. Favini asserts that he has shown the error not to be harmless

and, as such, the State's argument to the contrary is without merit.
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11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In Light Of
The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case
Mr. Favini was convicted of cutting the hand of another individual, in the web
between the thumb and forefinger, with a small pocket knife, leaving a one inch scar.
(Exhibit, pp.2-3.) He asserts that his unified sentence of fifty years, with five years fixed,
is excessive in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case. In its Respondent's
Brief, the State mischaracterizes the record. First, based upon a summary made by the
19-2524 evaluator who found that Mr. Favini was malingering, the State asserts that
only one of the various mental health facilities that Mr. Favini had been to diagnosed
him with a mental illness - "Sacred Heart Medical Center made a discharge diagnosis
of 'paranoid psychosis Schizophreniform,' but the records did not elaborate on that
condition." (Respondent's Brief, p.11 (citing PSI, p.76).) The State's interpretation and
reliance upon this summary is misguided.
A letter from Darwin Kellicut dated May 5, 2010, demonstrates that Mr. Favini
had been participating in counseling and hypnotherapy for the previous two months,
and that he was at the time taking "several psychotropic medications by prescription."
(PSI, p.23.) Mr. Kellicut stated, "My initial assessment indicated that he was severely
anxious and depressed, and was feeling very socially isolated.
moderately obsessive-compulsive,

phobically anxious

He appeared to be

about some things,

and

paranoid." Id. Next, a letter from Martha Nelson dated March 4, 2009, indicates that
Mr. Favini had been in the CHAS Clinic in Spokane, Washington, for the previous six
months and that he had barriers to employment including, "ideas of reference,
disorganized thinking, paranoia and psychosis not adequately controlled by current
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medications." (PSI, p.24.) In addition, Ms. Nelson noted, "Ronald takes anti-psychotic,
anti-depressant and anti-anxiety medications. He has odd beliefs and magical thinking."
Id.

The PSI also contains a discharge/transfer summary from Thunderbird Treatment

Center in Seattle, Washington, that appears to address both substance abuse issues
and mental health issues and indicates, in a handwritten notation "Mental health stable,
bipolar dx and med stable ... ".

(PSI, pp.25-26.)

Next, the PSI contains multiple

documents from American Behavioral Health Systems dated between March and
August of 2007 at various times diagnosing Mr. Favini on Axis I of the DSM-IV with,
Delusional disorder, Bipolar disorder, type 11, r/o Schizoaffective disorder, and
Schizoaffective disorder.

(PSI, pp.27-34.)

In 2007, Mr. Favini was court-ordered to

participate in involuntary treatment for his mental health issues.

(PSI, pp.35-40.) A

Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluation conducted in 2004, diagnosed Mr. Favini as
Bipolar with a recent Manic episode. (PSI, pp.46-49.) An evaluation from G.P. Clinic in
Jail Health Services, diagnosed Mr. Favini with Bipolar disorder in 2003. (PSI, p.50.)
Finally, an Administrative Law Judge found in 1999, that Mr. Favini was disabled and
eligible for Social Security Administration benefits, in part, because he was Bipolar.
(PSI, pp.51-55.)
This information was contained in the PSI and was in addition to the 2007
evaluation referenced by the State in its Respondent's Brief. (PSI, pp.41-45.) In short,
the State's argument that "[r]ather than that one diagnosis being correct while all the
other diagnoses were wrong, it is possible Favini was malingering and 'over-reporting'
his mental condition at that time (2007), just as he did during his § 19-2524 mental

10

health evaluation prior to sentencing in this case" (Respondent's Brief, p.11 ), is belied
by the record and is simply without merit.
Furthermore, the State asserts that Mr. Favini has "trivialize[d] the serious nature
of his crime, and ignores the fact that he plainly tried to stab Mr. George in the torso or
stomach," based upon the State's appellate counsel's own interpretation of the
testimony contained in the transcript. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10, 12.) Although it is
certainly not binding on this Court any more than it was on the district court, it is worth
noting that the prosecutor who appeared at sentencing (Ms. Borgman) recommended a
unified term of thirty years, with ten years fixed (Tr., p.293, Ls.3-7), and the prosecutor
who appeared during the rider review hearing (Mr. Verharen), recommended that the
district court reduce the previously imposed sentence of fifty years, with fifteen years
fixed, to twenty-five years, with five years fixed (Tr. Supp., p.12, L.19-13, L.1). There
is no reason to believe that the prosecutors involved in the sentencing proceedings
trivialized the nature of the crime when appearing before the district court and
recommending sentences lesser than actually imposed by the court.
argument trivializes the severity of a fifty-year sentence and is without merit.
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The State's

CONCLUSION
Mr. Favini respectfully requests that this Court remand his case for a new
sentencing hearing, in front of a different district court, with instructions that the district
court not consider information obtained from the competency evaluation. Alternatively,
Mr. Favini respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence to a unified term of
twenty-five years, with five years fixed, or otherwise as this Court deems appropriate.
DATED this 13th day of December, 2012.
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